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LAND, LABOUR AND CAPITAL IN THREE RICE-GROWING DELTAS OF 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 1800-1940 
I 
1.1 This paper grew out of an attempt to understand certain features of 
the development of rice cultivation in the Central Plains of Thailand. 
lt became obvious that any theory or generalization propounded to explain 
the facts in this case ought, before too much credence is given to it, 
to be compared against experience in other countries. Fortunately, at 
about the same time that Thailand experienced this development, two 
other countries, Burma and Vietnam were going 'through similar change. 'Thus, . 
the study naturally grew into a comparative inquiry. 
1.2 The presentation below makes no attempt to present a balanced or 
symmetric account of the developments in the three countries. The 
"Thai-centric" view of events, a consequence of the way the paper 
originated, should be obvious even if I had not mentioned it. The 
other two countries are slighted in the follm-ling account for two 
opposite reasons: Bunna, because the facts are very well known: 
Dr, Adas's recent dissertation, used liberally in this paper, can 
hardly be expanded on; and Vietnam, because very little published work, 
on which I had to rely, exists on the developments in the 11ekong 
Delta. 
1.3 In terms of subject matter, I have concentrated on land tenure 
and emergence of a landless labouring class in the rural areas, because 
sufficient variations are observed that call for generalization. Topics 
such as agricultural technology (except, to some extent, water control) have 
been slighted because conditions in the three countries did not seem to vary 
sufficiently to permit generalization. Perhaps Burmese operations were more 
efficiently organized than in Thailand and approached the condition of 
"industrial agriculture" as claimed by Furnivall, but I feel that this is 
more the consequence of the ready availability of a class of agricultural 
landless labourers--a subject which I do examine below. 
1.4 In terms of time periods covered, the period 1880-1910 received the 
most favoured treatment because developments during these three decades 
were crucial to the later evolution of the areas covered. 
1.5 The words "deltas" and "delta areas" should be taken to cover the 
following areas: (i) the Irrawaddy Delta: districts south of Prome, 
Tharrawaddy and Eenzada and extending as far east as Pegu (This follows 
Adas's definition): (ii) the Chao Phraya Delta: areas south of Nakhon 
Sawan and extending to include the lower reaches of the Neklong and 
Bangpakong Rivers. (iii) The Mekong Delta: the areas to the west of 
the Vaico Rivers. These definitions may not always be followed when 
statistics are cited because of the necessity to follow administrative 
boundaries. 
1.6 The next section will cover, very briefly, conditions in the pre-Western 
period. Only certain aspects (such as population density, land laws, etc.) 
which are ralavant to the discussicn in the following sections are touched 
upon. Section III presents, in somewhat uneasy tandem, developments in 
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the three countries between 1350 and 1940. There is nothing novel in my 
brief description of the developn:ents in Burma and Vietnam, but my dis­
cussion of Thailand presents, I believe, some novel features. Finally 
Section IV presents an analysis of the developments as seen by an 
economist which, I hope, ~.-Jill be of some interest to future researchers 
in the field. 
II 
2.1 It is a well-kno,m fact as ~-;ell as an unresolved puzzle that South-
east Asia, particularly its mainland component, uas and is something of 
a demographic anomaly,
1 viz. it has always been significantly less densely 
populated than its nei3hbours, India and China. There are exceptional 
areas within the region, of course, such as the Red River Delta in i:lorth 
Vietnam and, in the present century, Java. If ue are to look further 
into specific areas uithin the region, -;rn find another puzzling feature: 
areas which we now regard as the most product:i.ve and the most fertile, 
were, in the mid-nineteenth century, sparsely populated relative to 
other areas of concentration within Southeast Asia. This included two 
of the three areas that we shall study, i.e= the Irrawaddy Delta and 
the Mekon~ Delta. 
2.2 Of these ti:,10 distinct issues~ the first (i.e. uhy the mainland 
Southeast Asian region as a uhole --:-1as and is underpopulated relative 
to India and China) is beyond the scope of this essay. Readers who 
are interested in the question are referred to the papers cited in 
-4-
Footnote 1. He shall concentrate our efforts on the second issue, i.e. 
why the Irrawaddy and the Hekong Deltas were underpopulated relative to 
the Dry Zone area in Upper Burma and to the Red P-iver Delta in Vietnam. 
First, we examine the hypotheses that has been suggested to explain the 
situation in each of the two countries concerned. 
2.3 For Burma, the usual vie,-1 has always been that Lower Burma was 
devastated by the Hon-Burmese wars of tl1e late eighteenth century. The 
period following that was one of rebellions and emigration on the part 
of the partially subjugated l'Ions and resulting punitive actions by the 
other side which in turn led to further rebellions and exodus. Only 
with the arrival of the British in 1852 did the natives begin to behave 
themselves, so it is said. Only then uere large-scale settlement and 
economic exploitation of the Delta possible. 2 
2.4 This vieu~ a very common one amongst historians as well as pro-
colonial writers, has now been seriously questioned by Adas~ in his 
3recent d · ·issertation; h.e argues h h ·tat t,e maJor f "blactor responsi e f or 
the low level of cultivation of the Delta was in fact the prohibition 
of the export of rice, making its production in the Delta area unat-
tractive as an economic proposition. This disincentive factor uas 
4enhanced by the fact that the Delta area was highly malarial. We 
shall discuss both the conventional hypothesis and Adas's critique 




The explanation usually given for the case of the Mekong Delta, in 
contrast to the very heavy concentrations in the Red River Delta in the 
North as well as the coastal plains in Central Vietnalt½has generally been 
2.5 
in terms of the migratory tendencies of the Vietnamese people. Thus 
Gourou writers: 
"The differences [in the population densities] between 
Cochinchina and Tongking are explained by dissimilar 
historical evolution•• " •• The Tongking Delta is the 
cradle of the Annamese people, and the ancestral 
hearth from which it has ex;:,anded. Cochinchina, on 
the contrary, has been settled only very recently 
by the Annamese. ~,5 
The areas settled later were tht1s liable to be less densely populated 
than the areas of older settlement. Thus, if one were to take all the 
alluvial plains of Vietnam suitable for rice cultivation, one would 
find a more or less steady decline in population density, as one goes 
from North to South, reflecting the general southward movement of the 
6
Vietnamese people. 
2.6 Finally, there is the hypothesis that these delta areas were 
basically uninhabitable without the construction of modern large-scale 
7 
water control systems under the auspices or advice of the Europeans. 
For lower Burma and Thailand as a whole, this is manifestly untrue. 
Although large-scale control systems were constructed, e.g. the 
Henzada embankment and the Rangsit System!) these form only part of the 
entire Delta areas. For Cochinchina the argument is prima facie more 
plausible as the French ,,ere engaged in massive canal digging projects 
in the 1890vs, "ihich were to be the chief factors responsible for the 
2.7 
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creation of vast estates in the areao But to conclude from this fact that 
settlement of the area had to wait for the coming of the French is an 
unjustified step, and ignored the capacity of the local institutions to 
cope with the hydrological problem. We need not commit ourselves to the 
Wittfogel view that the Southe:ast Asian monarchies were ultimately based 
on control over large-scale irrigation Harks, but we may merely observe 
that where the need arose, Southeast Asian societies had been able to 
build dams~ construct elabora;:e dykes and canal systems to tame the waters 
well before the arrival of the Europeans. In terms of the degree of 
complexity, even the French conceded that the hydrological problem in 
the Red River Delta, successfully tackled by the Vietnamese, was more 
serious than that of the Mekong Delta where the problem was to dig a 
series of canals wr1ich would transfer the water to outlying areas when 
8
the level of Hekong is raised by a rising tide. 
All of the above theories are essentially ad hoc arguments offered 
as explanations of conditions in one or two of the three countries 
concerned. If one looks at the problem in a comparative perspective, 
one must remain unsatisfied with these arguments. Take, for example, 
Adas's comments on the low density of population in Lower Burma. The 
Chao Phraya Delta experienced almost exactly similar conditions in the 
9nineteenth century and yet it has always been much the most populous 
area in Thailand, at least from the fourteenth century onwards, possibly 
even earlier. Similarly, the Thais also i1ere involved in a southward 
. - '" f h h f v· lOmovement f rom e:1.ther :i:unnan or rom t e extreme nort. o ietnam. 
2.8 
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They first entered the Chao Phraya valley quite a bit later, but the 
bulk of the Thais moved south at a md.re rapid rate than the Vietnamese. 
The main objection ·to these hypotheses, it seems to me, lies in 
their neglect of the basic factors connected with the political organi­
zation of these states, on the one hand, and certain obstacles imparted 
by irrigated wet-rice cultivation on population movements on the other. 
It is generally forgott2n that in Southeast Asian states generally~ and 
in Burma and Thailand particularly, the question of population distribu­
tion was as much a matter of state policy as of the free choice of the 
populace concernedJ 
11 These states, en.gaging frequently as they did in 
brief but large-scale military campaig:1s concentrated during the five­
month period between the harvesting and the planting of the rice, had 
to be able to mobilize its troops quickly, i.e. all the able-bodied 
males that the government could lay hands on in a short period. Com­
munication facilities being what they ,,,ere, this meant that the areas 
around the capital city would have to be sufficiently populous so as to 
generate a respectable army. outlying areas would be settled only to 
the extent (a) that they helped the central power in its campaigns into 
the areas under contra]. of other po•-1ers (Nakhon Si Thammarat in the 
south of Thailand was such a settlement) and (b) that they did not at 
the same time pose any serious threat to the central powero The 
moment they became too powerful, t11ere wouid be an attack from the 
central government, its population would be ):ransferred to the central 
part of the kingdom, and the area depop,1lated. A classic example of 
-8-
this kind of treatment occurred in the case of the Thai annihilation of 
Vientiane following the lattervs revolt in 1826 and the transfer of part 
12of its population to the Central Plains area. The social system under 
which these transferred people would live T·:ras organized so as to limit 
13their freedom of movement--in some cases they would simply be enslaved. 
2.9 We have thus far assumed the choice of the capital site as a datum, 
but this is not a good assut11ption. All three countries shifted their 
capitals at the end of the eiehteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
What guided their decisions? The Burmese, for example, made a conscious 
decision to move their capital fron Pegu in the. south ('.:dth access to the 
Delta area proper) to the interior at the end of the eighteenth century, 
whilst the Thais continued on in. the central plains ,even though the 
area had been devastated by the invadin;_=; Burmese armies. The explanation 
for this difference seems to lie in the fact that Upper I3urma had at the 
time a large~ well developed irrigation system constructed and maintained 
largely by the peasants themselves who s:-muJ.d. thus be inclined to stay put 
and thus more easily ,,1obilisable in times of ~-;ar, rather than the more 
14fluid population in the South. Althou8h similar irrigation systems 1:1ere 
developed in the north of present-day Thailand~ the plains of the North 
were rather small and unable to support a state large enough to challenge 
15the paramountcy of Burma and Lower Thailand. The Chao Phraya delta thus 
became the center of the Thai state even before the developments of the 
past 120 years were to emphasise the situation even more. The fact that 
the pe.asantry around the Burmese capital was probably more stable than 
-9-
that around Bangkok can be linked up with tl1e impression (as far as my 
present knowledge goes, it is no more than an impression) that the 
Burmese king appeared to have less trouble raising I1.is army than his Thai 
counterpart. 
2.10 The discussion in paragraphs 2.8 and 2.9 has tended to overlook 
Vietnam. The case of Vietnam~ I shall now argue 5 can be treated using 
the same principle. Hhile the institutional working-out of the population 
policy differed considerably from the case of Burma and Thailand, because 
of the considerable differences in tradition and background, there was 
as in those tr·m countries 5 the same close connection bet,-;reen military 
requirements and settler1ent policy. The Vietnamese people had, until 
the early twentieth century, been pressinf' south•rards, at an extremely 
low but steady pace. The movement was slm-r because it was deliberate. 
It did not take place because of a helter-skelter movement of people 
freely migrating in search. of new lands and new opportunities. This 
movement had been, from the very beginning until the collapse of 
traditional Vietnam, an organized one uith the central authorities 
settling prisoners, war refugees and the poorer villagers in mili­
16 
tary colonies on the frontier. It is through such slow but per­
sistent organized settlements that enabled the Vietnamese to triumph 
over the Chams and to beat the Khmers in the drive to the '1ekong 
Delta even though the centre of the Khmer Empire uas much closer. 
The moving of the capital to Iiue from Hanoi is rather more difficult to 
explain in terms of the Burmese and Siamese models. It is possible to 
argue that the Nguyen. emperors 9 political base and therefore the more reliable 
portion of the populace had always been in the south; and hence their choice 
of the capital was determined rather by tl1e degree of loyalty than by the 
stability of the population (which .-1as the same in i.Jorth and Central Vietnam). 
This viei, overlooked the traditionally rebellious character of Central Vietnam. 
The Tay-Sons, which came close to annihilating the Hguyens, started their 
rebellion near Qui Nhon in the south-central area. For the present, we had 
to leave the explanation of the shift of capital to factors other than 
17those examined above. 
2.11 Thus, on the eve of the era of massive changes initiated by the 
British and the French, the distribution of tbe population in the lowlands 
of Southeast Asia may be summarised as follm,1S. There were heavy concen­
trations in the Tonkin Delta and along the coastal plains of Central Vietnam. 
The 1:1:ekong Delta area was well-settled but capable of absorbing a much 
larger population without any change in techniques as far south as the 
Bassac River, as were the Dry Zone around the capital of Burma and the 
Chao Phraya Delta. Cochinchina southwest of the Bassac River and the 
Irrawaddy Delta were, to all intents and purposes, "empty," as were the 
more northerly part of the Chae Phraya Delta. These differences, both 
among and within the three countries, were to play si3nificant roles 
during the colonial period to be discussed in Section III below. All 
the hill areas of Southeast Asia, ravaged as they were by malaria remained 
sparsely populated up until the later 1940's. Other areas, e.g. the Korat 
Plateau, Peninsular Thai.land, the Arakan and TenasseriT!l coasts have a 
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demographic history somewhat independent of the core areas under consideration 
and will therefore not be further considered. 
2.12 Population settlements within the three delta areas were concentrated 
in patches, usually along the rivers and canals--much as American settle­
ments in the West were strung out along the railway lines, and for the 
same reasons. In Burma, the settlements were largely concentrated near the 
towns; also, there was more cultivation in the northern parts of the delta 
than in the south. 18 For the Chao Phraya Delta the cultivated areas were 
strung out along the banks of the rivers and canals with the concentration 
being mostly in the south. The northernmost extension of large continuous­
ly cultivated areas was probably located somewhere in the present-day 
province of Ang Thong, 19 on the main strea~ of the Chao Phraya. There was 
probably less cultivation alone; the ~Jakhon Chai Sri and along the Bangpakong 
rivers except along their lower reaches where extensive areas were given 
over to sugar-cane. 'the Mekong Delta ha<l. been settled by Cambodians prior 
to the coming of the Vietnamese. By the time of the French Conquest, the 
Delta appeared to have been well penetrated by the latter, at least as 
far southwest as the Bassac River, and there was little doubt that eventual­
ly the Transbassac area would also be theirs. Politically, it was already 
part of the Vietnamese Empire. 
2.13 The primary crop grown was rice, although the extent of the diver-
20sification appeared to be much larser then than now. The methods used 
for growir,g rice were equally diverse. The use of the plow and the 
practice of transplantation of rice were already well-established through-
-12-
out the area. Yet there existed many areas where a great deal of 
. 1 . . i 1 21 . h 1 . . 22shifting cu tivation tooK pace~ owing tote popu ation scarcity. 
Because of the prevalence of the lattei: practice land laws in Burma and 
Thailand did not recognise permanent property rights in land that held 
regardless of whether the land was cultivated or allowed to return to 
jungle. Where the land was cultivated, however, the cultivator's rights 
were recognized subject to payment of the land tax. These rights were 
moreover transfe,7rable by sale. The Vietnamese land system is somewhat 
more complex, although the same principle applied, i.e. no one had any 
23right to land which was left fallow. Since Vietnam, particularly the 
northern and central portions, ho.d bee·.1 settled and intensively cultivated 
for a long period of time, property rights in land were much more developed 
than in the other two countries, with resultine; tendencies toward concen­
~ration of: land ownership occurring from t~.me to time. Equally important, 
such developments were considered dangerous by the Imperial Court and 
24periodic land redistribution would then take place. 
2.14 Side by side with this murky area of property in land was the equally 
murky concept of property right in labour. Here again, in Southeast Asia, 
the rights of a slaveowner were hedged about by a greater number of re­
strictions than those which attended, say~ a slaveholder in the American 
South. First of all, there were many types of slaves. Those which 
corresponded most to the Western idea of slaves were the prisoners of 
25 wars and their descendants, who had no rights at all theoretically. 
But this group probably was sr;,all~ parti.cu1arly in the 1850' s after many 
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decades when no important wars were fought involving heavily populated 
areas. More important probably were the debt slaves who had mortgaged 
themselves for a loan, and had been "foreclosed." In this case the 
restrictions on the "owner" were many. Thus" in Thailand:1 the "owner" 
was required to relinquish his property if the slave could ~epay the 
debt or to turn over the slave to a new 11owner11 whom the slave could 
persuade to pay his debt for him. There were also many other types of 
forced labour imposed by the central government, or the nobility or the 
village authorities on the peasants. Thus, most "free men" in Thailand 
were theoretically required to perform corvee labour for the King. But 
the census and registration of these individuals were conducted by officials 
who thus came to have powerful roles in societies and were able to divert 
26
such labour for their own use. This, of course, made the status dif-
ference between slaves and "free men" very slight. 
2.15 With the coming of the Western powers in :Surma and Vietnam, the 
concept of property rights was regularjzed. Property rights over 
individuals were, of course, entirely abolished. Corvee labour was 
either converted into a capitation tax or else was utilized by the 
colonial state for public projects, but its administration was tightened 
so that less leakage occurrede Property rights over land, on the other 
hand, were made into permanent rights--albeit after an initial period 
when settlement and cultivation had to be established by the would-be 
27 owner. In neither Burma nor v::-_etnam was there any effective ceiling 
on land acquisition" 
-14-
2.16 In Thailand, in certain respects, the move touards a Western concept of 
property took place with a lag of a few decades. Slavery was gradually 
abolished over a lengthy period starting from 1875 and ending in 1902; 
the category, furthermore, of "free men" owing their services~ to the 
King but to members of the nobility was gradually abolished and everybody 
was made into commoners owing only corvee services to the King (the peak 
of this process occurring in the mid-1830 9s). 
28 Later on, the labour 
services required were all converted to a. standard capitation tax; and to 
all practical purposes, forced labour of all kinds, except military 
conscription, disappeared from Thailand. Changes in the property 
rights in land were minor. ',;".'itle deeds based on cadastral surveys 
were issued which ensure permanent rights to the land, but to this day 
the proportion of non-urban land for which title deeds have been issued 
remains small. The growing permanence of settlements is the main cause 
rather than the consequence of the view that land is a piece of property. 
Thus in areas where no title deeds were issued, papers issued by district 
offices recognizing settlement over the land in question served as sub­
stitutes. In the last analysis, the main determining factor in the social 
evolution of Thailand in the latter nineteenth century was the changes 
in the degree of freedom enjoyed by the peasants much more than the changes 
in the concept of property in land. 
-15-
III 
3.1 With the rapid growth of rice production and exports from the 
1three delta areas starting from the mid 18SO's and 1860's initiated 
by the lifting of the ban on the exports of rice by the governments 
(colonial and indigenous) of the three countries, itsimpact is clearly 
evidenced in changes in import patterns and the concomitant decline 
2in domestic industries, or the intrusion of foreign Asian elements, 
3particularly into commerce and finance, or on public finance and 
4ad~inistrative system. The activities of the peasants in making all 
this possible> on the other hand, remain very much in the shadow. The 
only work that details these activities is Atlas's for Lower Burma. 
It is based on the various Settlement Officers 9 reports. The other 
two countries are less happily endowed with documents from officials 
as well-informed on peasant activities as these reports and therefore 
have generated less detailed secondary literatur~. Prof. Ingram's 
5work on Thailand and Dr. Sansom's on Vietnam do touch on these topics 
to some extent but the main foci of the books lie elsewhere. 
3.2 I shall present here a description of the settlement process in the 
delta areas. No attempt will be made to give a complete treatment of 
the subject--that could not be done in an article. Nor will any attempt 
be made to give a balanced treatment of the subject. Apart from the 
Thai-centric view mentioned already in the Introduction, I shall emphasise 
the so widely varying land relationships that emerged in the three areas. 
3.3 
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Since the period 1880-1910 was so crucial to this emergence, I shall 
concentrate on this period, giving the 1850-1880 and the 1910-1930 
periods only brief treatments. In sum, this section is but a prelude 
{albeit a lengthy one) to the analysis o: Section IV and serves merely 
to prepare the gr©und for the latter. 
In the years 1850-1880, the foci of development were in the areas 
that were already well-settled in the pre-1850 era: the more northerly 
parts of the IrrawadQy Delta and the districts near Rangoon; 
6 the areas 
7
close to the main rivers and canals in the Chao Phraya Delta; and, 
finally, the more easterly of the Cochinchine9e provinces such as Bien 
Hoa, Cholon, Gia Dinh and Go Cong., Cf the central provinces, Ben Tre 
and Vinh Long appears to have been well cultivated from a very early period.
8 
It is an ob11ious but nor.etheless 1.n unexplained fact that settlement in 
Southeast Asian lowlands take place on an "oil·--slick11 pattern rather than 
on a "bed-sheet" pattern; that is to say,. as opportunities for rice-
farming arose in the 1350 1s, we would expect the small population of 
that time to spread itself uniformly thinly over the entire Delta areas, 
and as population grew to intensify its cultivation gradually (this is 
what I have called the "bed-sheet" pattern). What happened instead in 
all three countries, most distinctly in Vietnam~ was the pattern of new 
settlements being planted contiguous to the existing ones, so that if we 
look at the map of population densities, we would see, during the period 
of expansion a rapid increase in one set of districts while the others 
remain unchanged" Once th8se districts were settled upto a level~ there 
-17-
would then be a dramatic expansion in another set of districts usually 
but not always contiguous to the first set. This is the "oil-slick 
pattern". 
3.4 In Burma and Vietnam the developments were in fairly well-settled 
areas already and there uas probably somewhat less migration during 
this period (1850-1880) than in the following ones: whatever migration 
9there was, the level was probably higher in Burma with developments 
proceeding at a faster rate there than in Vietnam where the French 
appeared considerably slower at establishing themselves as masters 
of Cochinchina. 
3.5 With the louer level of migration the need for outside capital 
must have been less with the result that the expansion during this 
period was accompanied by comparatively low levels of borrowing. The 
result was that, in the case of Burma, most of the capital needs during 
this period were handled by the Burmese moneylenders themselves--the 
10Chettyars at this time confining their operations to the urban areas. 
3. 6 Hhat happened in Thailand during this pet,iod is rather difficult to 
pinpoint. it must be remembered that the liberalization of the rice trade 
was not immediately followed by the el:i.mination of the corvee system or of 
the slavery. The "bound" status of mos': of the Thai population had not 
thus been loosened in the same degree as that of the Burmese, for example. 
It is possible, then, that the first group of people who responded to 
the signal of rising prices were the people who had control over labour 
and who thus were in a position to exploit the labour under their control 
3.7 
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for commercial gains for the first time. Although the evidence on this 
11
is rather slim. What is more likely is that the bulk of the farmers 
moved out on their own to expand the cultivation of rice, rearranging their 
obligations to their patrons, either through increased services at the 
latter's farms or through increased "gifts" in cash or in kind.
12 
The next period, from the 1880's to about 1910, there was further 
expansion, but now more and more :Lnto the vast empty areas that were not at 
all Hell settled prior to this movemento ~Jhilst the physical hardship 
13 
involved in the clearance work had a.mays been and remained great, 
the social complexity of this ne~-1 movement increased enormously. It 
was a period when the migrc1tory wave from Upper Burma to the Delta crested, 
but also when further expansion in the ·;yell-settled Horth became more 
difficult. This latter fact thus directed the migrants to the Central 
and E'ast-Centra1 D 1 
14 
Fnicn' were most · · te.deta areas , · a1 ent::..re1y un1.nh.abi 
Given the lack of outside employment opportunities as well as the remoteness 
of his "home base", the migrant had to depend either on his own resources, 
or, if he had none which was usually the case, on the moneylenders. This 
was the period when money lenders came into their own. The Burmese 
rural credit market began to evolve into one of the most clearly dif~ 
ferentiated in Southeast Asia. At the retail level, Burmese moneylenders 
remained predominant as in the previous period, lending money now at 36% 
per annum compared to higher rates which prevailed until then. This 
scaling down was made possible as a result of the intrusion into Burmese 




wholesalers lending to Burmese moneylenders at 24% per annum. In most of 
these eredit transactions, particularly the ones involving the Chettyar 
15
land was used as security, a fact of great importance later. To the 
casual observer of the Burmese scene,then, the situation in the Burmese 
countryside, while far from idyllic--frontier areas are seldom that--but 
at least was not one of gloom and doom. The degree of tenancy was not 
very high"•'and the tenants' situation was good" Since, with so much land 
available, his standard of living had to be comparable at least to the 
other pioneer farmers to whose status they could reasonably aspire. 
Beneath the surface, if one looks at the extent of indebtedness and thus 
the amount of land subject to mortgage, the picture is quite different. 
The following table is quite illustrative 
Table I 
Percentage of Cultivators in Debt (Irrawaddy Delta) 
1880's 1890 1s 1900's 
North 38 20 35 
West Delta 26 34 36 
Central 26 42 40 
East-Central 68 61 61 
East n.a. 30 46 
Source: Adas, op. cit., Table IV-G. 
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As can be seen, the newly settled areas (the last three on the list) 
experienced the highest degree of indebtedness. 
he D 1 f Centra1 Cochinc. h.ina
16 was c1eared3•8 In t Mke ong eta, most o 
and settled. The really big developments in the extreme west (i.e. 
17 
Transbassac Area) were to occur in the 1910's and the 1920's. 
Although a great deal, probably the major portion, of the land settled 
during this period, was cleared and settled by pioneer farmers moving 
from nearby areas just as in Thailand (see below), there was already 
certain developments which were to become characteristic of the Mekong 
Delta, and that is the policy of extremely large land grants adopted 
by the colonial government, and the consequent stratification of 
South Vietnamese rural soc:Lety into groups of large landlords, small 
farmers tilling their own land, tenant farmers and landless agricultural 
labourers. 
3.9 We do not have a very clear picture of who benefitted from the various 
land grants. Generally the provincial officers were empowered to approve 
grants and issue title for land upto 20 hectares. The Colonial Council, 
a legislative body subservient to French colons' interests (until about 
1900), was empowered to approve grants beyond 20 hectares, and most of 
these were made to Frenchmen. (Cnly after 1900 were large grants made 
also to Vietnamese).
18 By 1900, French concessionaires were able to acquire 
78,000 hectares.
19 
Ve may set against this about 1 1/2 mn. hectares 
r 20 It is clear then that the French concessionscultivated in 1905-o. 
played but a minor role in the Cochinchinese rice industry. 
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liJhilst it is true that very little land (in plots above 20 hectares)3.10 
were granted by the Colonial Council to Vietnamese individuals, we must 
also, from other evidence, date the origin of the class of Vietnamese 
landlords from this period; although their backgrounds and identities 
remain extremely shadowy. He can establish the following scattered facts 
about them. First of all, it is clear from the preceding paragraph that 
the French-dominated Colonial Council played but a minor role in the birth 
of this particular class. Although particular individuals may be cited 
who acquired large tracts of land as a consequence of their collaboration 
with the colonial regime in Saigon, 
21 the bulk of them probably owed their 
acquisition to their influence at lower levels of government, particularly 
·11 ., 
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--tra 1t:1.ona11 om:i.nate' d b 11-to-dowit. h t he vi age cotcnci-s d' . y d y t he more we 
members of the village. 'I'here is also the likelihood that the complaints 
made by contemporaries concernin8 the decline in the status of the village 
councils and their difficulties of recruitment may be associated with the 
departure of the rural elite from their status-enhancing roles as councillors, 
once their wealth-enhancing activities as landlords were established. 
3.11 Whilst we placed the or:i.gi!!_ of the landlord class in the period 1880-
1910, it would be a mistake to :·_nfer that they were at that time the 
. 23
predominant groupo It is important to note that the provinces that were 
being settled at this time were the provinces of Central Cochinchina where 
the proportion of land mmed by large landholders ~,ere smaller relative to 
the western provinces, which became rap:.tdly settled only between 1910 and 
1930. 
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3.12 The situation in Thailand was again different. llhereas in Vietnam 
large estates were l::ell:ng established, in Thailand large estates were being 
broken up, except in one area. 
23a !he main reason for this was the very 
rapid political developments occurring during this period, when the Thai 
monarchy successfully undermined the political influence of the powerful 
families both in the capital and in th0. provinces and made rapid strides 
towards a highly centralized political aystem. 
24 These political changes 
had naturally a vast impact on members of the political elite--Hhom··.f.or.> 
want of a briefer term I shall call the 'nobility'. To understand this 
impact we had to examine, first, the economic role played by this nobility. 
3.13 We have alluded a.lready (paragraph 3.8) to the role played by the 
Thai nobility in large-scale commercial rice farming. This line of 
activity was not the only one follm-Ting by the nobility. Receiving only 
minimal stipends from their royal master, officials necessarily had to 
resort to trade and other activities which u·ould be deemed irregular by modern 
standards. This tendency was further facilitated by the fact that officials 
would have allocated to them a certain number of phrai luang (rough 
over whom they exerted a great degree of control.translation: royal serfs) 
Recourse to this group of serfs for their private benefits was not 
(b)considered wrong if (a) the Royal Treasury shared in the benefit and 
the exploitation of the serfs was not unduly harsh. Through these means 
the Thai nobility was able to participate in various economic activities 
from the establishment of sugar mills to gold mining. In the South, 
officials bid for tin-mining rights and the right to import Chinese coolies. 
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In this latter case, many of the officials involved were themselves 
Chinese. Indeed the bifurcation of the top levels of Thai society 
into Thai bureaucrats and Chinese businessmen did not really come into 
being until the early years of this century--and this occurred as a 
direct consequence of the reforms of the late 19th. century rather than 
the opening up of the coun.try to free trade in the mid-19th. century. 
Within the Centra.::. Plains, then, we have the establishment of some3.14 
large rice-farming and sugar-·cane grcwing estates, particularly along 
the canals radiatin6 east anc.i west of the city. Thus in 1884, we have 
25 
a French account of an estate on the banks of Khlong J"lahasawat owned by 
a 'Phya Mountriev~
6 , over 1000 raisin extent (170 hectares--large by 
Thai standards) and employing debt slaves. The same writer indicated 
that such large estate far.ning was quite common in the Chao Phraya 
27 
Delta area, and probably operated by powerful members of the nobility. 
But, here again, it would be erroneous to extrapolate these observations 
to the rest of the Delta area. The area observed by this particular 
area frequented by Europeans. It was almosttraveller was the only c:'.'ural 
a fief of the premier family, the Bunnags~ who would be expected to 
have established large estates het..e~- What the conditions j_n the provinces 
north of Bangkok, say, would be like is more difficult to establish. My 
hunch is that ue probably would f:i.nd more i~stances of peasant farming 
than in the western provinces. 
3.15 Thus, in the very same account but a little later, we have a 




of points may be noted concerning these villages. First, although these 
were prisoners of war or their descendants, they were not slaves, but 
were phrai luang (royal serfs) subject to corvee on royal works, and were 
under the control of Gbao Phraya Si Suriyawong, "head" of the Bunnag 
family. 
29 Second, they appeared to farm the lands and grow rice or 
pal m-sugar Or betel
30 on t"i1ei r own account. 
3.16 We have also, in urban areas--not only in Bangkok but in various 
provincial centres, large groups of people attached to various patrons, 
as retainers or domestics; or people who while pursuing their activities 
largely independently, 1·1ere obliged to stay near their patrons. All these 
people thus helped to swell the urban population--particularly in the 
provincial areas--t:o a greater deg:cee than what it would become. 
3.17 The reforms of the 1890vs and the early 1900's--the completion of 
the abolition of slavery~ the ficial replacement of the corvee obligations 
by the poll-tax collected directly by the central government, the conse­
quential loosening of the legal ties between patrons and clients and, 
finally, the reforms of the administration--helped to free large numbers 
of individuals to follow their economic interests. This is putting matters 
wein a positive light. Alongside the positive effects of these reforms~ 
also have large groups of people who 1:1e::::-e suddenly thrown on their o"t-m 
resources for survi·val. At the kernel of these changes was the great 
weakening of the ties that bound the masses of the people to members of 
the elite. We shall nmt examine the effects this had, first on the 
behaviour of the nobility, then on the non-elite group. 
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3.18 As was already mentioned, traditionally Thai officials, receiving 
only nominal stipends (bia l1at) from the King had to engage in various 
extra-curricular activities, such as trading, on a fairly regular scale. 
The kings, on their part had ahmys accepted this and even themselves 
participated in these activities, until Hell into the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn. From the mid-1880's on, the king Fas determined to 
curtail the independent powers of the nobility, by replacing it with 
a salaried bureaucracy. The story of how these reforms were carried 
out enough known and is l:)e11 not be repeated here. 
31 The important 
effect that should be noted is that it successfully undermined the 
control exerted by the officials over their clients, as uell as forcing 
them to leave their other independent economic activities, to become 
simply salaried bureaucrats. 
3.19 This did not lead necessarily to the economic ruin of the nobility. 
The personnel of the administration did not change much, except in the 
Northeast
32 and the ranking of the elite families probably Femained the 
same as before. Whereas they formerly exploited the people below them 
directly for sustenance, they now could depend on their own salaries, 
after the reforms,which were in turn financed by the taxation which was, 
collected by the central government. What changed uas the element of 
control. The elite now looked to the central authority for position, 
status, advancement, etc., and had no need--nor indeed any legal require­
ment33--to concern themselves with their clients. Similarly he was 
precluded from taking any part in trade. ~ince the needs of the 
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bureaucracy at the time were immense all the Thai members of the 
elite opted for it~ leaving trade to the Chinese. Herein lay the 
origins of the sharp division of Thai society into Thai bureaucrats 
and Chinese businessmen--a division exacerbated by the later elim­
ination of the tax farms and the resultin3 complete exclusion of the 
Chinese from the world of bureaucracy. 
3.20 The former slaves and clients of these officials, having been 
released from their masters and patrons ':1ere thus the main 3roup 
providing the thrust to the expansi.on in the 1B90' s and the 1900' s. 
To the extent that many of these had lived in towns, there was 
probably a decline in the urban population, with the important 
exception of Bangkok, although~ 2,ren there, some out-migration occurred 
34also. :·Jhere these people obtained the capital to survive the 
difficulties of the first years of establishing the farmsteads is 
something of a mystery. There was no doubt that some of them 
maintained, in their earlier years, some sort of contact with the 
urban areas from which they came and thus obtained the resources to 
survive those years. Also, and probably the most common pattern, part 
of the land was first hurriedly cleared and cultivated on a slash­
and-burn basis, with the farmer gradually extending his domains as his 
position became more secure. What is clear however that whatever 
the methods used, recourse to moneylenders on the bc:.sts'. ,of land 
35mortgages was an uncommon phenomenon during this period. 
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It would be appropriate to close the discussion of the developments 
of
3.21 
this period 1880-1910 in Thailand by describing the Rangsit scheme, b
ecause 
-(i) it covers quite a large chunk of territory in the Central Plains
, (ii) 
the problems faced by it in the beginnings throw light on cctiditions
 in 
the Central Plains generally even though the Rangait area was not a 
typical 
case and, finally, (iii) because it is the one area in the Central P
lains 
where the proportion of land under tenancy uas and is as high as 90%
. 
3.22 The Rangsit area covering approximately 240,000 hectares, 
36 lies 
northeast of Bangkok. Before its development, its main problem uas 
the poor 
water system which made it unproductive. The solution to the problem
 was 
to build a grid of canals and, at the points connecting the grid to 
the 
chao Phraya a number of locks ·were installed Fhich enabled the water
 to be 
stored well after it receded in the rest of the Plains, thus prolong
ing 
Once the canals werethe period during which the ric1: plant may grow. 
Allconstructed, they could be useful as transport conduits as well. 
this, of course, made a large area of land which wduld otherwise 
remain uncultivated into an extremely productive region, but it also
 
demanded a great deal of investment. 
3.23 It is not certain how the traditional state would have han
dled 
The monarchy in Thailand had usually concernedthe decision to invest. 
itself much more with construction of canals as transport routes tha
n 
with canals as water control devices. Strategic considerations also
 
played a large role. 
37 But, supposing that a decision having been made 
to go forward, it uould have been considered a state project. The 
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corvee labour would then be pressed into the construction of the canals 
and plots of land, particularly the choice sites, would be granted to 
members of the nobility in charge of supervising the construction38 or 
to the royal princes and princesses. 39 The method used in this case 
was, however 11 completely new and, as we shall see, unique in Thai history, 
never to be repeated again. 
3.24 A private company ~·!as set up, calling itself the Siam Canals, Lands 
and Irrigation Company which undertook to finance the excavation of canals, 
using hired labour. The company would be granted plots of land benefit­
ting from the i::roject, which it could sell and, which it did--largely to 
members of the elite, including the King himself. After 25 years, the 
canals, the locks, etc. would be turned over to the Government to maintain, 
and the company, having no further function, would then dissolve. 40 
3.25 The company duly obtained its concession in 1889 and proceeded on its 
programme. Peasants began to settle on the land from 1895 on. Although 
it had some troubles quite early on with respect to competing land claims, 41 
it appeared to have overcome that problem and by 1903--when the project 
42
•
was only half-way through it was considered a "financial success 11 The 
cananls, locks, etc. were duly turned over to the government in 1915, but 
the land remained in the hands of the speculators who bought them with 
the result that the area showed the highest degree of tenancy to this day. 
3.26 How the Rangsit area was seU.led is completely unknown--no work has 
yet been done on this important topic. There is no doubt, however, that 
the first settlers were tenants also, some of them coming from the coastal 
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areas further south which were affected by the increasing salination of the 
43soil and water. The share of rent paid by the tenants is completely un-
known. If one is to make an estimate (whose basis is extremely ·weak), it 
44would come to about 20% of the crop. This,if true, implies that most 
of rent then was differential rent owing to the superiority of the irrigated 
land rather than the scarcity rent arising from shortage of land in general. 
3.27 Despite the financial success of this operation, no privately financed 
45pro3ect was h ield irrigation.. f urt er undertaken i n tne' f · of · · · Indeed, public 
work in this area was also extremely slow: an ambitious project conceived 
by a Dutch engineer was postponed and, later, considerably pared down. 46 
Large-scale irrigation of the Chao Phrayadid not go f~rward until the 1950 1 s 
and the 1960's. One happy, if unforeseen, result of this dilatoriness was 
a postponement of the existence of high levels of tenancy that has, in 
Thailand always been associated with large-scale capital projects--whether 
47
privately or publicly financed. 
3.28 We may thus summarise developments in all three areas in the period 
1880-1910 as one in which rapid growth occurred; but also one in which 
the groundwork for future problems was already firmly established: the 
heavy dependence on rural credit provided by the Chettyars in Burma, the 
origins of large estates in south Vietnam and the connection of tenancy to 
public projects, in both Thailand and Vietnam. The period 1910-1930 was 
to witness the uorking out of these developments--developments which 
were to be seen in all clarity :.n the crisis years of the 1930's. 
-30-
3.29 This period is marked by the growing difficulties in all three 
countries arising from the fact tr.at "the frontier is closing", perhaps 
48
nowhere more clearly seen as in Burma. As land became scarce, the 
levels of tenancy began to rise. The standard of living both of the 
tenants, as well as those of agricultural labourers, began to decline, 
so that tenants' standard of living began to be compared against labourers 
rather than against 01:mer-occupiers. With the decline in available land, 
and the reduced attractiveness of settling in as tenants, migration from 
49Upper Burma fell off , compensated by increased migration from India. 
The Indians whilst continuing to dominate the towns, also began to move 
in on the land in large numbers--helping to push the prevailing wage­
rates of Burmese agricultural labourers down and land rents up. All this 
was, of course, accompanied by increasing social tensions, mainly finding 
outlets as communal conflicts between Burmese and Indians. 
3.30 To the extent that new settlements vrere beir,g established, they 
represented the final phase of the "filling up" of the area. It also 
came at a time of full maturity of the credit institutions in Burma. The 
result was that development in this period was the most capitalistic in 
form. Not only was there a greater incidence of indebtedness, but 
tenancy rates ,;-1ere also higher, the area per farm higher than elsewhere 
and the presence of agricultural labourers more ,;-1idespread. 
3.31 Developments in the i:iekong Delta followed a similar pattern, with 
the notable difference that moneylenders played a smaller role, whilst 
large-scale land developers featured more prominently than in the 
Irrawaddy Delta. The period 1910-1930 saw the occupation of the western 
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provinces of Cochinchina, simultaneously with full flowering of the develop­
ment-by-landlord system. Large-scale canal digging projects the French regime 
penetrating into the Caman Peninsula were followed by the land-clearing and 
development on the part of landlords successful in bidding for the land.so 
The result was that the ·newer areas showed higher levels of tenancy than 
the older settled areas. (See below, Table IV) 
3.32 Thailand, here again, showed the exceptional pattern. The core area 
settled in the period 1880-1910, including the Rangsit region, generally had 
and still has somewhat higher levels of tenancy than the area that was settled 
in the 1910's and 1920vs--generally on the fringes of the core area.
:,1 
3. 33 t·Jhilst our knowledge of the period 1910-1930 and of the human aspects 
of the process of settlements of that period remains skimpy (again with 
the notable exception of LowP-r Burma), the onset of the Great Depression-­
that great clarifier of matters economic--led to an immense production of 
statistics, particularly on land tenancy. These figures are interesting 
in that, coming as they did during a crisis they seem to bring out clearly 
the problems that were sometimes latent in the previous sixty years of 
development. Reproduced below are various statistics on the incidence of 
tenancies in the three delta areas broken down by regions or provinces. 
These data are comparable across countries only if one handles them 
with extreme care and use them more as indicators of orders of magnitude, 
than as the basis for fine distinctions. Thus r-,hilst the Burmese figures 
are based on annual crop reports whose coverage was theoretically complete, 
the figures for Thailand are obtained from a sample survey covering one 
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village within each of the provinces. 
Table II 
Patterns of Land Holding in Lower Burma 
Region 
Percentage of Occupied Areas 
Let to Tenants 2 1930-1(a) 
Average Size ot 
Paddy Holdings b) 
(in hectares) 1920-30 
North 41 4.7 
West Delta 54 10.1 
Central Delta 55 10.1 
East Central Delta 62 19.0 
East 31 7.3 
Sources: (a) Adas,.££.· cit., Table X-3, p. 481. 
(b) Ibid. ii Table VIII-11, p. 399. 
Table III 
Patterns of Land Holding in Central Thailand (1930-1) 
Percentage of Land Rental Average Cultivated Area 
Province In. Per Farm (in hectares2 
Bangkok 46 2.5 
Thonburi 11 1.0 
Thanyaburi 93 9.3 
Ayutthaya 32 s.o 
Lopburi 13 4.1 
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Table III continued: 
Province 
Percentage of Lac~d 
Rented In l J 
Average Cultivated Area 
per Farm (in hectares) 
Saraburi 7 3.1 
Suphanburi 5 6.9 
Phetburi 32 2.8 
Chachoengsao 30 4.7 
Source: Carle C. Zimmerman: Siam: Rural Economic Survey 1930-31, 
(Bangkok, Bangkok Times Press, 1931), Table IIE (p. 25). 
Note (c): The survey gives the areas owned, rented in and rented out. 
To make the figures comparable with those from Burma, I have 
taken the ratio of areas rented in to the total of areas owned 
and rented in. 
3.34 Ho figures exist for Vietnam which are roughly comparable to the above. 
As a highly imperfect proxy for area under tenancy, I shall present below 
figures for proportion of land owned by proprietors of 50 hectares or more. 
Since the average amount of land farmed by a tenant farmer was between 
20-40 hectares, those figures, if used to measure the degree of tenancy 
would thus be a considerable under-estimate. Nevertheless, the "tenancy 
ratios" exhibited in Table IV were quite high compared, not only against 
Thailand (outside the Rangsit Area) but also against Burma. 
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Table IV 
Patterns of Land Holding in Cochinchina 1927 
Percentage of Land Owned by Proprietors 
Province of 50 hectares or more 
Ben Ire 28.5 
Cholon 17.1 
Go Cong 37.2 
Tan An 38.1 
Vinh Long 40.8 
Can Tho 51.7 
Hy Tho 31.3 
Sa Dec 35.1 
Soc Trang 43.S 
Tra Vinh 46.1 
Bae Lieu 65.5 
Chan Doc 43.4 
Long Xuyen 53.1 
Rach Gia 61.6 
Source: Yves Henry, Economic Agricole de l'Indochine,(Hanoi, 1932) 
pp. 182-183, 189. 
Note: Fo"J.1¥-My·Tho, Cholon, Tan An, Can Tho and Bae Lieu, the relevant 
figures was calculated by Henry and given on p. 189. For the 
others, the shares of land held by proprietors with 50 hectares 
or more are calculated from the frequency distribution presented 
by Henry on pp. 182-3. For the upper tail of the distribution 
(more than 500 hectares), the distributions for all the other 
provinces were assumed to be centred on 1070 hectares, which 
was the average amount of land owned by proprietors with more 
than 500 hectares in the five above mentioned provinces for 




This section presents some tentative hypotheses that appear4.1 
justified on the basis of what little evidence there is. It is hoped 
that these hypotheses will aid future work in the economic history of 
the area, on uhich a great deal still needs to be done. 
4.2 The basic question behind the analysis of this section is the 
following: TJhy is it that Thailand appeared (in the 1930's) to have 
encountered less social tensions in the countryside as a result of its 
post-1850 developments compared to the Burmese and the Vietnamese in 
their delta areas? The answer to this question depends in turn on our 
answer to another question: ~,)hat is it that prevented the almost 
empty delta areas from being occupied at a faster rate? In particular, 
why is it that farmers in certain areas within the Delta were practicing 
"advanced" sedentary agriculture whilst at the same times others were 
1
practising shifting agriculture. 
4.3 Ester Boserup has given us an analysis of the reasons for the 
conexistence of several agricultural systems side by side with one 
another. 2 Her explanation is in terms of differing population densities 
forcing agriculturalists in the denser areas to adopt the more labour-
.~ 3 
intensive techniques. Indeed it is true that while the more easterly 
provinces of the Hekong Delta were undergoing rapid expansion in 
acreage devoted to wet-rice cultivation, the agriculturalists in the 
districts surrounding Camau, in the far south were largely engaged in 
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shifting cultivation of rice. Similar conditions existed earlier in 
the Irrawaddy and the Chao Phraya Deltas.
4 nut this type of cultivation 
very soon disappeared from the Delta areas. Its replacement by a sed­
5 
entary system of farming required a great deal of investment. It is 
my contention that it is as much the rate of investment as the supply 
of labour that ~'las the primary constraint on the rate of expansion of 
the rice production; and, more importantly, it is whether the pioneers 
were able by themselves to finance these investments that determine the 
land tenancy pattern that became evident by the 1930!s. 
4.4 A comparison between the experiences of Burma and Thailand (excluding 
the Rangsit area) in the period 1880-1910 will, I think,help clarify the 
point. The Lower Burmese expansion depended for its labour force on the 
Upper Burmese migrants, whilst the Thai peasants generally moved fairly 
short distances, if at all, to find their new settlements and clear new 
lands. Now a pioneer who could fall back on his original resources would 
be better able to go ahead without much recourse to outside sources than 
would a migrant from a distant area. Hence it is that the Burmese pioneer 
had to rely far more heavily on the moneylender than his Thai counterpart. 
The primary investment having largely been financed from this source, it 
is not surprising that when the collapse came in the 1930's most of the 
land fell into their hands. 
4.5 But that was not the only result, because of this more pressing need 
on the part of the Burmese pioneer, the Burmese rural 
credit market was considerably more sophisticated and more extensive, and 
once large supplies of credit are "on tap", it became possible for the 
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Burmese landholder to adopt methods that are not feasible for the Thai 
pioneer. The most important ones hinge on his independence of the 
constraint imposed by having to use only family labour. Using outside 
oncecredit, he could use hired labour to clear a larger area of land and 
they were cleared he could use it to farm this enlarged area. ~-Jhen hired 
labour was not available from indigenous sources, there was nevertheless 
The end resultsufficient capital to use imported labourer from India. 
was that, in comparison with Thailand, the size of the average holding 
larger. (See Tables II and III above); but on the reverse side ofwas 
the coin, we also have a much larger proportion of completely landless 
agricultural labourer in the Irrawaddy Delta
6 --a notable proportion of 
whom are Indians. (Chinese coolie labourers who arrived in Thai almost 
never worked as farm labourers). 
4.6 Not only cau the effect of the availability of credit be recognised 
in the contrast between developments in Thailand and Burma, but also in 
the contrast betiieen the areas within Lower Burma settled in the pre-1880 
period (of which the Northern Delta area is a good example) and those 
settled in the 1880-1910 period (e.g. the Central Delta). Thus not 
only is the observed tenancy rate (in the 1930's) lower for the former, 
but also the acreage per holding in the North is distinctly lower than 
in the Central Delta. (See Table II above) The contrast arose because 
of the differences in the supply of credit the former before the problem 
of supply was "solved" and the latter after. 
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4.7 We have thus far discussed investments (almost entirely from private 
sources) used to finance land clearing and settlement. But this might be 
and were supplemented by considerable investments in land improvements-­
particularly in canal-digging designed for irrigation purposes, but 
eventually extensively used for transportation as well. A good part of 
the Delta lands were in no condition to be brought rapidly into cultivation: 
these included the Rangsit area which until the canals were dug, u-as short 
of water and much of Transbassac area which suffered from excessive 
These areas, when finally brought into cultivationsalinity of the soil. 
as a result of necessary large scale irrigation uorks, were characterised 
by a landlord-dominated system of tenure--regardless of whether the relevant 
irrigation works were carried out under public or private auspices. The 
Rangsit case was clear-cut--the investment costs were borne by private 
investors, and the benefits were captured by them. 
4.8 I wish to make, however, a stronger point: i.e. even if the Rangsit 
project were financed from public funds~ a landlord system of tenure 
would still dominate the area. This is because unlike the irrigation systems 
that are practised in Upper Burma and Northern Thailand, the type of water 
control that emerged in the Deltas were from the farmers' point of view 7 
"exotic" systems. They were planned from the center. "\·ihich parts of the 
land would benefit from the project and which not, was known first in the 
capital. Given the great differentiation in Southeast Asian societies and 
the concomitant slowness in the transmission of information, it is clear 
that the situation was ripe for speculation. 
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4.9 This was indeed what happened in the Transbassac area of the Mekong 
Delta. The French canal building there was followed by the development 
of extremely large estates. It must be.·quickly added that these large 
estates were not only the results of the hopes of capital-gain realizations 
discussed in the previous paragraph~ but also arose from the need for 
rather heavy supplementary investments by the would-be landlords. As 
mer,tioned earliert one major problem of the Transbassac area was the 
excessive salinity of the soil. This means that the soil had to be 
washed clean, usually by flooding and then draininf,--which tended to 
increase the e;estation period of the investment and thus put it out of 
reach of small scale pioneers. Another area in the !Iekong Delta which 
7early attracted landlord-led development ,,1as the Plain of Reeds. 
There the problem was the presence of alum, which had accumulated in 
8the poorly drained area. 
4.10 Another factor of some importance in Thailand and Vietnam--the 
two countries where long-distance migration played a slight role was 
the administrative overhaul that the two countries underwent in the 
late nineteenth century. In Vietnam, the successive French measures 
undercutting the power of the village cauncils--traditionally dominated 
by the wealthier villagers led to this group turning away from using 
direct political domination as a means of enhancing their power and 
prestige into attempts at acquiring economic domination. In Thailand, 
the local powers of the provincial nobility were also much reduced by 
the action of the monarchy 1 but in its place the Bangkok 80vernment 
offered high-salaries and positions in the central bureaucracy to the 
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The result was the creation of the system of political-­provincial elite. 
and economic--domination by Bangkok which has been characteristic of th
e 
Thai polity down to the present day. Also, as noted in Section 3.19, i
t 
succeeded in diverting the Thai elite away from commercial activities a
t 
least temporarily (i.e. until after the Second Horld War)~ leaving the 
field to the Chinese who, as a result of the financial reforms of the 
1890's and 1900's, were frozen out of any political influence which the
y 





Appendix: The Sequence of Settlement in the 
Mekong Delta 
A.l This is, to my present knowledge, no published account of the 
p cess of settlement in the 11.ekong Delta following the arrival of the 
French. Consequently our knowledge of the sequence of settlement in that 
area is weak. The following is an attempt, using highly imperfect data, 
to give a very rough sequence of settlements for the period 1870-1930. 
A.2 The data used are the areas under rice cultivation in the dif-
ferent provinces for the years 1881, 1888, 1908 and 1927. The first 
two are used in tandem to indicate cultivation in the 1880vs. Basically 
the 1881 figures are used, but where the figures given there appeared 
unreasonable or are unavailable the 1888 figures are employed. The 
three provinces involved are Bien Hoa (unreasonable), Bae Lieu and 
Gia Dinh (unavailable). The 1888 figures for Sa Dec appeared unreason­
able. Of all the other provinces Tra Vinh showed an incredible jump 
in area cultivated between 1881 and 1888 but it is difficult to assess 
which of the two is the more reliable. The 1881 for Tra Vinh is 
provisionally accepted. 
A.3 The provinces are then divided into three cateBories, on the basis 
of the areas cultivated in 1881 (or 1888) and 1908 as percentages of those 
of 1927. Category I include those provinces for which the percentage of 
area cultivated in 1881 (or 1888) is greater than 50: these are the 
provinces of settlement was substantially completed by 1880. As can 
be seen they are mostly provinces outside the Mekong Delta proper plus 
-42-
some of the more eastern delta provinces. Category II are those provinces 
for which the percentages of area cultivated in 1881 are less than 50 but 
those in 1908 are greater than 80. These are the provinces for which the 
process of settlement was completed between 1880 and 1910. Finally the 
remaining provinces are the remaining ones whose percentages of the area 
cultivated in 1910 are generally less than 60. Table A.1 provides the 
figures used in the categorization, 
-43-
Table Al 
Areas Cultivated in Rice in 1881, 1888, 1908 and 1927 
in the Mekong Delta 
(Hectares) 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 



































































































































































Notes: aAppears unreasonable. 
n.a. Not available. 
Sources: Columns (1)-(3): Albert Coquerel, Paddys et Riz de Cochinchine (Lyon, 1911) 
Tables III.and IV. 





1. This expression was first used by Wilbur Zelinsky in "The 
Indochinese Peninsula: A Demographic Anomaly", Far Eastern 
Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 2 (February 1950), pp. 115-145. 
A more modern and complete discussion may be found in C.A. Fisher: 
"Some Comments on Population Growth in South-East Asia, with 
Special Reference to the Period since 1830," in C. D. Cowan (ed.), 
The Economic Development of Southeast Asia: Studies in Economic 
History and Political Economy, London, Allen & Um11in, 1964, pp. 
48-71 
2. See, e.g. J. r. Cady, A Pistory of Modern Burma (Ithaca, N.Y., 
Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 39-44; J. s. Furnirall, An 
Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma, Third Edition, 
(Rangoon, People's Literature Committee & Rourse, 1957), p. 41. 
3. Michael P. Adas, "Agrarian Development and the Plural Society 
in Lower Burma, 1852-1941," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Wisconsin, 1971 (University :Microfilms No. 71-28653). 
4. Ibid., pp. 41-45. 
5. See Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in French Indochina 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), p. 174. 
This book will be referred to henceforth as Land Utilization. 
6. This is only roughly true. Within well-defined areas (e.g. 
the Tonkin Delta), the population density does not reflect the 
settlement history. See Pierre Gourou, Les Paysans du Delta 
Tonkinois (Paris, 1965), p. 137. 
7. This was mentioned in passing, in David J. Steinberg (ed.), 
In Search of Southeast Asia: A Nodern History (New York, Praeger, 
1971), p. 222. A stronger viel-7 may be- found in R.• Sansom: The 
Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta (Cambridge, Hass-.­
M.I.T. Press, 1970), p. 48. Sansom included not only the engineering 
achievement of the French in Cochinchina but also their medical 
achievement in making settlement of the Delta possible. 
8. Thus Yves Henry in his Economie Agricole de l'Indochine (Hanoi, 
1932), p. 628 stated: "The undH:ed river of Cochinchina does not 
subject the countryside to the formidable flooding as is the case 
-45-
Footnote 8 continued 
with the Red River." See P. Gourou, Les Paysans du Delta Tonkinois 
(Paris: Mouton & Co., 1965), p. 76 (to be referred to from now on as 
"Gourou, Les Paysans"o) Although he later claimed that the results of 
the heavy work on the dikes over the centuries "fell wide of perfection" 
(p. 85), we must acknowledge that it was sufficient to support a popula­
tion whose density lvas and is, far and m·ray, the denest in Southeast 
Asia. 
9. The volume of rir.e exports from Thailand prior to 1852 was low and 
and erratic. (See Jo C. Ingram, ~conomic Change in Thailand 2 1850-1970 
(stanford: Stanford Un:..ve.rsity Press, 1971), pp. 21-24. The outbreak 
of malaria soon after the clearing of 1.ice lands also occurred in 
Thailand. See Howm~d IC Kc.ufman~ _fl_~:agkhuad: A Community Study in 
Thailand (Locust Valle·?, N.Y.~ .T. J. Augustin~ 1960L p. 15. 
10. This la·~ter novel hypothesis about the origins of the Thais 
comes from Robbins Burlir.g: Hill r-arms and Padi Fields: Life in 
Hainland Soutneast Asia (Engle.wood Cl:tffs~ N.J. ~ Prentice-Hall, 
1965), pp. 93-94. 
11. An alternative tactic employed by the central monarchy was the 
divide-and-rule system f.l.S practiced b7 the Thais on the Korat Plateau 
and by the Burrr,ese ic t:1e Shan area. This however could lead to 
trouble shan an outside enemy Lh~eatened, since the arrangements 
for defense would be fragmented and uncoordin&ted. 
~2. The rest (p:;oba1:ly the majority) were settled on the Korat 
Plateau which was divided into a number of petty principalities, 
subject to Bangkok~ ,·'hich employed the diviae-,and-rule tactic 
mentioned in footnote 11 aboYe. 
13. See Akin ::1.abibhadana~ Th,~ Orgar.ization of Thai Society in 
the Early Bangkok Period. 1782-1873 ~ (Ithaca, 11. Y. : Cornell Data 
Paper No, 74~ 1969), I havP been unable to find any good account 
of social organization in pre·-coloniaJ. Burma except J. S. Furnivall, 
op. cit., Chapter 3, ;vhich suggests that there were considerable 
freedom of movement. 
14. The fact that the peasants working in areas in which they 
have invested a great deal of labour tended to be more stable than 
otherwise is mentioned by Clifford Geertz on, Indonesia in his 
Agricultural ln7olut:i.on: The. Process of Ecol9gical Change in 
Indonesia (Berkeley: "Jnj_ver;;;ity of '.:.::alifo::n.ia Press, 1968), p. 34. 
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15. The state of Chiangmai tried to make a go out of it from 
time to time, but its place in thepolitical history of the area 
(particularly from the end of the 18th. century on) is securely in 
the footnotes. 
16. For the method of settlement within the Tonkin Delta, see 
Pierre Gourou (Les Paysans du Delta Tonkinois (Paris, Mouton & Co., 
1965), p" 135, pp. 207-208. Trinh Roai Due: Ristoire et Description 
de la Basse Cocr.inchine. Translated from Ch~nese by G. Aubaret. 
(Paris: 1863), p. 10 discussed ~he settlement in the South in the 
early 18th" century. Alezander B. Woodside: Vietnam and the Chinese 
Model (Cambridge;, Hass. Harvard University Press, 1971) p. 250, discusses 
the attempt by th,:! 7ietnamese to settle their own people and the 
Chinese ir.,. Cambodiao For a general survey of the subject, see It. G. 
Cotter, "Towe.rds a SociaJ.. History of the Vietnamese Southward Movement/' 
Journal of Southeast Asian History: 'Iol. 9 (Harch 1968), pp. 12-25. 
17. See vJoodside~ ibt<l., p. 127. 
18. See M. Po Adas, op. cit&, pp, 37-39. L.s.ter on, (p. 46) he 
points ou;: th;;,;.r: ·:;:rc::1.spianted rice was known to be practiced in the 
Henzada-Prome arsa:.and see:'.lled to imply that shiftinr.; cultivation 
was practiced e:i.sewi-:.,,~rc,. Now transplanted rice is usually grown 
in inte".lsively cultivated nrea~i whil2 shifting agriculture is 
common ia sparse areas. This seems to indicate generally that the 
northern pm::t of the delta is mr.::re densely populated. 
19. See Lucien M. Hanks, 11 Bang Chan and Bangkok: Five Perspectives 
on the Relation of Local to rfational History$" Journal of Southeast 
Asian History, VoL 8s Noo 2 (September 1967), p, 251. For a 
contempora:cy account (but refer:dng to 1834 rather than 1855), see 
Mgr. Jean-Baptiste de Pcllegoix, Descri.ption du Royaurne Thai ou 
Siam, 2 vols., Paris, 1854~ Part III, See also the building dates 
of the ,,ar:.om, temples in P.,ng Thong in Nai Huan Phinthuphan, Ang 
Thong nai adees_ (in Tbai)~ (Bc1ngkok, Krung Siam Kan Phim, 1971). 
There seena to be two peaks in the temple building activities, the 
first tm-mrds the end of the Ayutthaya Era (18th Century A.D.) and 
the second in the thil·c'. and fourth reign8 of the Bangkok Era. The 
probable history of the settlement in the province is thus something 
like the following: extensive cultivation during the Ayutthaya Era 
when the capital was ne1rby~ folloued by a period of decline with 
the fall of Ayutfr.aya .s.11d the mo,,2ment of the capital further south, 
and then resettlement .:..n the -::hi~d and fourth reigns. 
20. S{~e, ecg. Pallego::..x, op" c:U:. For a t:,.eoretical argument why 
this should be so, see S" .\. Re;-;.ick, '.!The Decline of Rural Industry 
under ;:;;xport Expansioni A Cornparicon among Bunna, the Philippines 
and Thailand, 1870-1938~ 11 Journal of ~conomic History, Vol. XXX No. 1 
(March 1970), pp,, 51-73. · 
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See 11. P. Adas~ op. cit., p. 46, also J. S. 
Furnivall, "Land as
21. 
Vol. XIX (December 1909),
a Free Gift of Nature,
11 Econo.nic 3ourni::ll 9 
PP• 552-5620 
Cf. Ester Boserup, The Conditions of Agri
cultural Growth (London,
22.
Allen & Unwin, 1965); tLe cos-xiGtence of a
re.,as intensive cultivation 
and of shifting cultivation would thus support 
her view that population 
density determines the method oi: ag:rj_cult
ure and not the other way 
'around. 
John Adarr,s a.nd I.fancy Hancocks, "Land and Ec
onomy in Traditional
23.
Vietnam/' Journal of Scuthc:2.ct Asian Stud
ies, Vol. I~ No. 2, p. 91. 
24. See Alexnnder L., Hcodsic:.e: V:::.etnarr: and t
he Chinese Model 9 
(Cambridge 9 Masse Harvard University Press,
 1971)~ p. 221. 
25. But even her-~~ it J s uot clear what was t
he extent of their 
rights. The fo}.i:}Wi".lg ae,::oent :1f slavery 
in Bangkok of 1826 shows 
the complexity 0£ th~ })!'."oble,r1: nAlmost a
ll public works and 
laborious services are exee1.1.:::ed at Bangkok
 by the Burmese prisoners 
and they rer.eive so sm<ill ~'- sukiisteace th
at they are permitted to 
l~vy Contributions uu,Ju the _inhabitants of the Co
untry, who attend 
the bazaars :'.n bo:ltf.:, an::-1. plJ thEo r:1.ver wit
h vegetables, fruit and 
other articles cf :food. We r8peatedly sm,
; two or three Burmese 
prisoners in D. boat chasing and plunciering
 the boat of some old 
Siamese woman," Captain Ren,:y Burney to G
eorge Swinton (Report 
dated 2 ijecember 1826) ~ Th!, Burney Pape1:~
, Vol. II, Part IV, Printed 
by order of the Con1mit tee of V~,j iranana L
ibrary, p. 72. 
For a full account of the status of 
11 Freemen" (i.e. phrai)26. 
R. Akin, Opo cit., particularly pp. 79-in traditional Siam~ see 11. 
91. 
27. See Adas~ op. ci_!_:__!? pp., 84-85. 
28. Khachon Sukkfo1phanit: Thana11don Phrai (B
angkok, Railways 
Pressj 1967)~ pp. 33-34. 
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Section III 
I. For a good collation of the terribly scattered sources on 
this topic see :iorman Go Owen, "The Rice Industry of 7 'ainland 
Southeast Asia 1850-191411 Journal of the Siam Society::, Vol. 59, 
Part 2, (July 1971), pp. 75-lt~3. There are two drey:-1backs to 
his study, (a) most of its statistical sources are secondary.
(This can create a great deal of problems, e.s. vaeueness the 
treatment of paddy versus rice exports) and (b) The emphasis
is largely on the export activities with only a cursory account 
of land tenancy problems (pp. 131-2), and equally Lrief treat­
ments of many production problems. It is this latter deficiency 
that I shall try to correct. 
2. See J.C. In~ram, op. cit., Chapter C; S. A. Resnick, loc. 
cit., u. Aye Elaingg "Trends of Economic CroFth and Income 
Distribution in i3urma, 1870-194011 Journal of the JJurl.7la ::-'.esearch 
Society::, Vol. XLVII, i::o. 1 (June l%l1) ~ particularly FP• 103-106. 
For Vietnam, there has been less literature centered on this 
question but see comments by Pierre Gourou in his Land Utilization 
on the differences irr the absence of art::!_san industry in Cochinchina 
as against its presence ir:. Tontin and Annam. 
3. The literature on this is vast, particularly for the Chinese, 
the reader is referred to the bibliograpl:y in v. Purcell: The 
Chinese in Southeast Asia (Revised edition, London, 1965). The 
cov-2rage on the Indians in Eurma is auch. poorer. Dr. Adas 's 
dissertation, already referred to, is the most helpful ,-rnrk 
knoun to me. The Chettyar community, in 9articular, is examined 
in Philip Sier;elman: 11 Colonial Development and the Chettyar: A 
Study in the ~colory of l'fodern Burma, 1350-1941 11 Ph.1). dissertation,• 
University of liinnesota, 1964 (University ;~icrofilm ,:To. 64-7301). 
4. J. s. Furnivall's extensive Fritings may be taken as representative. 
5. Ingram, op. cit.;~- L. Sansom: The Economics of Insurgency in the 
t:ekong Delta, (Car::ibridge, r:ass., 1970), Chapter 2. 
6. Adas, op. cit., p. 145. 
7. "A Tour to T!at, Pra Patom in 1865" Banp;tol: Calendar, 1871, pp. 
91~99 (particularly pp. 93-4). 
8. See Appendix. 
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9. On Burmese raizration before 1886, see the inconclusive discussion 
in Adas, op. cit., p. 124". 
10. ~-, pp. 166-7. 
11. See ::ine; Eongkut: Prachoom Pra.kat ifatchal:an Thi Ci, I'ho So 2401-
2411, (Collected :Jecrees of the Fourth Reign, B.E. 2408-2411), (Bangkok, 
'2urtisapha, 1961), p. 54 (:'.:lecree i·io. 284). For a later :,eriocl (1384), 
see Ir. 1:ardouin "Voya3e a ?atboury et a Kanboury" Cochinchine Francaise: 
Excusions et Eeconnaissances Vol. VIII :no. 19, p. 192. 
12. Prince Damrong ?ac!:anuphab: Thesaphiban, (l'angI~o!.,:, 1966), p. 20 
hints at such a ,ossihility. 
13. Adas, op. cit. pp. 14'.1ff., Howard !C. l~aufr,1an, :::anp;l:huad: A 
Community Study ir. Thailand (Locust Valley, ;1. Y. : J.J. Augustin, 
1960) p. 15. 
14. Adas, op. cit., pp. 147, 149. 
15. Ibid., pp. 166-<J. For an account of the Chettyar ecr.d their mode 
of oparation, see Sie~·elman, op. cit., Cha?ter V. 
16. I use the ter,,1 in the sense defined by Gourou :::Ln Gourou, Land 
Utilization, pp. 150ff. For the pace of settlement, see Appendix. 
17. :~ansom, op. cit., p9. 23-25; Pierr,a ;_:elin: L'endettement Agricole 
et la Liquidation des Jettes ARricoles en Cochinchine, (Paris 1939) 
pp. 27-23. 
18. ! ··11ton :~. Osborne: The French Presenc(; in Cochinchina and Cambodia, 
(Ithaca, 1'. Y.: Cor:1ell University Press, 1969), ~p. 144-5, also p. 322 
(n. 2). 
19. :enry, op. cit., p. 223. 
20. Ibid., chart facin3 p. 273. ~e use th~ figure for 1905-6 rather than 
1900 in order to allow time for the land concedetl to be developed. 
21. Osborne, op. cit., p. S4; Javid G. · '.arr: Vietnamese f..\.nticolonialis-:-,1 
1885-1925, (3er}·.eley, Calf., University of California Press, 1971), pp. 
93-4 cites the case of an anti-Frencli Sout:1 Vietnamese, 1i<;uyen Than Eien, 
uho nas a larze landlord in the South; hmrever, at the time of his 
acquisition of the land, he •ms still closely identified Pith the French. 
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22. This cannot be documer.ted hovever. Le Than],. Choi: Le Viet-: 1 am 
(Paris, 1955), ::,. 432 qa:::e rour~hly the same statement, also ,1ithout 
docum.entation. See. also Osborne, c;:,. cit., 1). 147. 
23. Thus, Sansom, op. cit., p. 24, traced the career of a landlord 
;rho built up his extremely lar3e hold:i.n':'.s in th2 l'.)OO's from other 
settlers uho failed. 
23a. See belo-::•• 1 paras. 3.21-3.27. 
24. For a brief history of these reforms, an-:1 reactions to t:1em see 
David K. Fyatt: The Politics of Reform :i.n Thailand: Education in the 
Reign of Kin8 Chulalongkorn, (Hew ''aven; Yale University Press 9 1969) 
Chapters 2 and 4; for their effects in the provinces, see Tej Bunna3, 
"The Provincial Administration of Siam from 1892 to 1915: A Study of 
the Creation, the Groi;rth, the Achievements and the Implications for 
·~odern Siam, of the '.1inistry of the Interior under Prince 0amron0 
i?.achanupl:ap11 (Hi.~:. Thesis, (~t. Antony's Collep:e, Oxford U:rdversity 1 
1968); for t::1eir effects on tl1e allocation of manpower 1 see ::hachon 
Sul:khaphanit, op. cit., pp. 3')ff. 
25. ::,.ardouin, loc. cit., pp. 1(}2-3. 
26. Very likely Phraya l'on.tri Surhrong (Chuen ~.u:1.:.na[:) (1346-1915}. 
27. The com;_:ilaint that rurLaway slaves consta;:1tly ;::laced themselv~s 
under the protection of poT•erful princes or officials rras a recurrent 
them in royal proclamations having to do •11th slavery. See I:ing 
Jiongkut, PP!'-4 :\fo. f,5 (in 1855), i.!o. 109 (ir~ 1857) ·10s. 139 and ll~O 
(in 1J58). 
28. T'. Eardouin: "Voya~e a Ratboury et a Lanboury--Suite et fin" 
Cochinchine Francaise. Excursions et 1:-.econnaissances~ Vol. VIII 
No. 20 Ciovember/')ecember 1884), pp. 431-3. These probably ,,.rere 
the very same ones mentioned in King ::ongl··ut, PPP.4, ,:10. 198. 
29. See \ 7yatt, op. cit., passim concerning this very importa~t 
figure in nineteenth century 'i'hailand. 
30. The proclamation cited in footnote 28 indeed excused these 
Villapers from the land tax on account of their being subject to 
heavy corvee Fork. 
31. See Tej 3unnas, op. cit. 
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32. '. 1-ichael VicLrey: 0 Thai i:-~e·:;::i.onal Elites and t:1e c'eforms of ~:ing 
Chulalongkorn", Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. YJax :-:o. 4, (August 
1970), pp. 863-:81. 
33. Under the old system the patron (the nai) ,;-ras required to produce 
his client in court in case the latter srasaccused of any Frans doing. 
34. In fact our only evideaee re13ardinz the settlement on the land of 
former urban dwellers, referred to the popule.tion of Bangkok and Thonbur5.• 
See I:aufman, op. cit., p. 15, F:anks, loc cit. 
35. It is an interesting fact that whilst the Chettyars 1·1ere notoriously 
ubiquitous in Burma and •-rere quite active (after 1900) in the ~:ekong 
Delta, they seemed to have bypassed Thailand altogether. 
36. J. Homan van der ::::eide: General Report on Irrigation and Drainage 
in the Lower llenam Valley, (:Gangkok, 1903), p. 26 footnote. Estimates 
differ fro~ source to source. 
37. Cf. the reasons r:;iven for the construction of tl:e canal mentioned 
in ranks, loc. cit. 
38. Ibid. 
39. King i.fonf~s.:.ut~ PF~. 4 number 206 (see tI:is item in the list of 
references). 
40. The company did try to extend its o::>erations towards the ~1est 
bank of the Chao Fhraya, but its request ,ras apparently turned do~m. 
See :,an~dom of Siam, 1~inistry of Lands & Agriculture, P.oyal Irrigation 
Department: Project Estimate for Porks of Irri~ation, Drainage and 
ifavigation to :Jevelop the Plain of Central Siam, Voltm1e III, (:'.:,ano;kok 
1915) pp. 12, 18. 
41. h. Farin3ton Smyth. Five Years in Siam, Volur.1e I (London 1893), 
P!?. 53-l~. 
42. Var~ der Lzic.e, _o__p_._c_i_·t_., p. 26 footnote, also see p. 66. 
43. Ibid., p. 32, Rardouin, op. cit., p. 196 claimed that the decline 
of the"Ta°l:hon Chaisi sugar cultivation :ras due to an increasinz 
Lrackishness of the ·water resultinP, from chan;::es in the amount of 
rainfall. (T::is last point is doubtful). Van der reide said that 
the inhabitants of the coastal areas had enlarsec. creeks in order 
to ship fire,-mod and attap, their principal produce, out and had 
thus um-rittingly led to increasing salination of the soil. 
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44. The price ofland nec2r a canal or river s:·Yas ;3iven in the TTard 
1::eport for 1913. (Vol. III, p. 43) as al,out LiO baht 11er rai. 
At a rent/land price ratio of 10% (at :,resent it fluctuates 
between 5-7%)? this c:::ives the annual rent as li Laht/rai. The 
Rangsit land yields a'Gout 6 piculs of paddy per rai (Van :for ''ei<le, 
op. cit., p. G3 or 4 piculs of rice, vhich at t·;<e ";,ric,"! of about 
5.50 baht ::,er picul (James C. Ine;ram, 11T'hailand's ".ice Trade and 
the Allocation of r.esources" in C.D. Cowan (e:I.), The f;conomj_c 
Development of Southeast Asia (London, Allen &: Unnin, 1964), p. 
121) gives us a gross return of 22 haht per raL The amount of 
rent as a ;,:iercenta~e of gross returns is thus somewhat less than 
20%. This compares uit~1 the 50;; rate prevailinr:; in the post­
Horld-'lar-II ;:,eriod. 
45. For problems arising out of this '_)reject, ,:hich began to be 
felt only in the late 1910' s (silting of the canals ••!as responsible), 
s-e J.C. Ins;ram, Economic Chanp;e ••• ~ p. 81. 
46. Ibid., pp. Cl-8L1. In3ram quotes e.n interestins observation, 
made in an official report~ that the reason for 3oi::1r slor-7 on other 
projects uas because improvements elser11here uould dra,-1 tenants a,,.ray 
from the P.angsit area, then largely armed. 1Jy t>e Thai elite. 
47. For the impact of irrigation ,,orLs in the :;ost-' 1orld Far II 
period, see I. Inukai? "ReE;ional Income T'ifferentials in Thailandn. 
(!1imeo from ILO~ ::an~Lo:::)~ p. 24. 
l~8. See Adas 9 op. cit., Part III. The follonins account is merely a 
summary of Aclasvs. 
49. There uas clso the increased attractiveness c>.s a. result of public 
works projects in Upper Burma itself. 
50. Sansom, op. cit., p. 23. 
51. It is rather difficult tote absolutely certain of this fact, 
as data on tenancy did not exist ur.til 1930/1931: 1v'.1ilst fi3ures 
by provinces of the cultivated area did not appear until 1922/1923. 
Furthermore many provinces covers an area of diverse topography~ 




1. Briete, "Lapport sur la Circonscription f;.e Camau11 Cochinchine 
Francaise: Excursions et Reconnaissances, Vol. I, 'To. 1 (DecenLer 
1G7?), p. 19 
2. E. Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Grev!th, (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1965), Chapter 6. 
3. Rigorously, one has to assume immobility of lahour; for if labour 
i;-1ere mobile, and if, as she sugr:;ests, it prefers more "primitive" (i.e. 
less labour intensive) techniques, (ibid., pp. 53-Li), there would be 
a movement away from the nore croHded area--~f!1ic!-:. demands heavy Fork. 
The co-existence of several systems will not then i:ie observed. 
4. See·above, paragraphs 2.12-2.13. 
5. For an account of the<investment needed in a similar operation in 
modern times, see E. L. Fisk: Studies in the Rural Economy of Soutreast 
~ ( ), Chapter. 
6. lfo figures for this category exist for TI1ailand before 1960. I\ut 
for 1960, of the labour force listed in the asriculture, there is the 
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